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Note
The 4 R's of Drug Testing in Public Schools: Random
Is Reasonable and Rights Are Reduced
John J. Bursch*

In the 1980s, school officials in Vernonia, Oregon, observed
a troubling increase in student drug use.' After repeated
attempts to halt the increase, including classes, seminars, and
even a drug-sniffing dog, the school had not solved its drug
problem.2 As a last-ditch effort, the Vernonia School District
instituted a policy requiring random drug testing for any student
wishing to participate in Vernonia's athletic programs.3
Seventh-grade student James Acton challenged Vernonia's
policy, claiming that the urinalysis drug testing procedure
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.4 A federal district court dismissed Acton's suit,

* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; BA & B.M.
1994, Western Michigan University.
1. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2388 (1995)
("Students began to speak out about their attraction to the drug culture, and to
boast that there was nothing the school could do about it.").
2. Id. at 2389. Vernonia's failure to dissuade students from using drugs
through drug education is not unique. In a six-year program and study
targeted at low-income, urban elementary schools, a team of researchers found
"no significant differences in drug use initiation" between boys participating in
an anti-drug initiative and boys who did not. Julie O'Donnell et al., Preventing
School Failure,Drug Use, andDelinquencyAmongLow-Income Children:LongTerm Intervention in Elementary Schools, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 87, 87,
96-97 (1995). The researchers found only a slightly lower rate of drug use
initiation for girls. Id. at 96. But see Gilbert J. Botvin et al., Long-term Followup Results of a Randomized DrugAbuse Prevention Trial in a White Middleclass Population,273 J. AM. MED. AssN 1106, 1111 (1995) (finding fewer users
in program actively discouraging drug abuse).
3. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. Vernonia's testing procedure, urinalysis, was
99.94% accurate in identifying drugs in a given urine sample. Id. Once a
student athlete failed two drug tests, the district mandated either drug
counseling or expulsion from the athletics program. Id. at 2390.
4. Id. James Acton wished to play football but would not consent to drug
testing. Id.
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finding the search reasonable.' The Ninth Circuit reversed,6
holding that the policy violated Acton's privacy rights under the
United States and Oregon Constitutions.7 The court stated that
while Vernonia's interest in deterring student athlete drug use
might justify testing based on individualized suspicion, it did not
support random drug testing of student athletes.'
The United States Supreme Court in Vernonia School
District47J v. Acton reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding that, in
balancing Fourth Amendment interests, students in general
have a reduced expectation of privacy and that student athletes
as a group have an even lower privacy expectation.9 Relying on
the lowered privacy expectations inherent in student athletic
programs,'0 on the negligible intrusiveness of the urinalysis,"
and on Vernonia's important interest in stopping students from
using drugs, 2 the Court found that the school's special needs
outweighed the students' privacy rights.'" Although the Court's
ruling targeted one class of student drug users, it did not
address the drug use problem of students not participating in
athletics.' 4
Drug use increasingly has entered the mainstream in

5. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 769 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (D. Or. 1992)
(holding that the drug testing program was a reasonable, warrantless Fourth
Amendment search), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2386 (1995).
6. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1526.
9. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995).
10. Student athletes voluntarily choose to engage in an already regulated
activity. Id. at 2393. Athletes typically share a locker room that provides no
more privacy than a urinalysis drug test. Id. at 2392-93. Student athletes who
fail to abide by the rules and regulations of the sport face suspension from the
team. Id. at 2393. Each of these factors or characteristics is inherent in
student athletic programs and reduces the students' reasonable privacy
expectation.
11. Id. at 2394.
12. Id. at 2395 ("That the nature of the concern is important-indeed,
perhaps compelling-can hardly be doubted."). The Court observed that drugs
are most addictive during school years and that student drug use disrupts the
educational process, leading to lifelong losses in learning. Id.
13. Id. at 2397. The Court held that the state's compelling interest
outweighed the urinalysis test's Fourth Amendment privacy intrusion. Id.
14. Vernonia administrators and teachers noticed "a sharp increase7 in
student drug use, characterized by rudeness, profanity, and disciplinary
referrals. Id. at 2388. Vernonia singled out athletes for drug testing, in part,
because they apparently were the leaders of the drug culture. Id. at 2389.
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American schools 5 and has become an insurmountable obstacle
to the goals of education.'6 As drug use by teenagers continues
to rise, the public's support for drug testing in schools inevitably
will increase.'" Despite its growing public approval, however,
mandatory drug testing raises important privacy concerns.
Although federal courts have significantly narrowed Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and have
limited the constitutional rights of public school students
15. A survey by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research
reported that 25.2% of high school sophomores and 30.7% of seniors used
marijuana in 1994. Leef Smith, Back to School; Drug Use in Schools Takes
Turn for Worse; Officials Toughen Rules to Try to Curb Abuse, WASH. POST,
Aug. 31, 1995, at 1, 5 (Virginia ed.).
16. Researchers have documented an increase in violence associated with
drugs. See Clinton Decries 'Madness' of Teen Drug Use, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRI., Nov. 3, 1995, at A6 (reporting correlation between high school students
using drugs and students carrying guns and joining gangs). Alcohol and cocaine
use also are implicated in a significant number ofsuicides and homicides among
adolescents. U.S. Pub. Health Serv., Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse in
Adolescents, 50 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1737, 1737 (1994).
In addition to contributing to violent behavior, the increase in drug use
among American youth directly impacts their school performance and the
overall learning environment. John C. Shepherd, Time for Action on Child
Drug and Alcohol Abuse, A.B-. J., Dec. 1984, at 8 (noting that because
psychoactive drugs affect "mood, concentration, ability to reason and memory,"
they "interfere with learning and impair school performance"). Marijuana, for
example, has a lengthy detrimental impact on both physical and mental
performance. Lowell R. Beck, We Can Stem DrugAbuse, 68 A.B.A. J. 691, 691
(1982). In general, drugs hamper concentration, creativity, conceptualization,
and focus. Id. at 692. The Supreme Court has noted that drug use correlates
with school disciplinary problems. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339
(1985).
Although researchers have not established a causal relationship between
drugs and dropouts, "there is a definite correlation." SELECT COMI. ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., DRUGS AND DROPOUTS
2 (Comm. Print 1986). An increased dropout rate harms not only the
individuals dropping out, but the entire society. Dropouts from the class of
1982 alone will cost the nation over $55 billion during their lifetimes.
SUBCOMIT TEE ON EcoN. GROWTH, TRADE, AND TAXES, 102D CONG., IST SESS.,
DOING DRUGS AND DROPPING OUT 52 (Comm. Print 1991) (citation omitted).
17. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995)
(noting "unanimous approval" of student athlete drug testing policy by parents
attending the policy's "input night"). Drug testing programs in contexts other
than public schools have enjoyed some remarkable success. See, e.g., Stephen
M. Fogel et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 553, 561 n.34, 562 (noting 65% to 80% success rate rehabilitating company
employee drug users as well as drop in U.S. Navy drug use from 47% in 1981
to 4% in 1984) (citation omitted); Mark Rust, The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1, 1986, at 51 (noting that "the [U.S.] military's drug testing program...
has sharply lowered drug use in the armed forces").
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generally," student Fourth Amendment privacy rights are not
yet "dead.""9 Inevitably, courts will decide whether a school can
mandate random drug testing for all its students without
violating the Constitution. °
This Note contends that the Supreme Court's holding in
Acton gives public schools blanket authority to impose random
drug testing on entire student bodies. Part I describes federal
courts' recent trend toward narrowing both Fourth Amendment
protection and public school student constitutional rights. Part
II analyzes why courts have moved in this direction and
contemplates the extension of the courts' reasoning to various
drug testing programs. Part III proposes a random drug testing
program for an entire public school student body that should
pass constitutional scrutiny. Although random school-wide drug
testing threatens the viability of student "privacy," such a
program is both consistent with Acton and necessary for schools
to regulate effectively the educational environment.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND ACTON
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. " 2 Although the FourthAmendment guards againstboth
state and federal privacy invasions,22 federal courts have carved
out so many exceptions to Fourth Amendment requirements that
courts rarely find police searches and seizures unconstitutional.23

18. See infra Part I.A. to I.B.
19. '[C]hildren assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights... at the
schoolhouse gate.'" Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
20. See id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("I comprehend the Court's
opinion as reserving the question whether Vernonia, on no more than the
showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine drug testing not only
on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all students
required to attend school."); see also id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(charging that using student athletes as a testing class resulted more from
hopes that testing would survive constitutional scrutiny, rather than calculations that it effectively would combat the school's drug problems).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. The Supreme Court has extended both the Fourth Amendment's
protection and the exclusionary rule to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
23. In describing the warrant requirement, for example, Justice Scalia
stated that it "ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is basically
unrecognizable." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
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A. DISAPPEARING PRiVACY RIGHTS
1. Searching for a "Search or Seizure"
Before deciding whether a particular action violates an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights, a court must find a
government action resulting in a "search or seizure." 24 To
determine whether the government has conducted a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes, the court examines whether the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
person or in the place searched.2 5 Surprisingly, courts have
held that citizens have no reasonable expectation of privacy in26
private land and buildings outside of their homes' curtilage,
airplane carry-on luggage,2" conversations with third parties,"
bank transactions,2 9 personal garbage, 0 or in their persons or

concurring).
24. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614
(1989) ("Before we consider whether the tests in question are reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, we must inquire whether the tests are attributable to
the Government or its agents, and whether they amount to searches or
seizures.").
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(articulating test for searches that involves examination of both the person's
subjective expectation of privacy and the objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy). Although appearing in a concurring opinion, the Supreme Court
subsequently adopted Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.
E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
26. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). In Dunn, officers
made a warrantless entry onto a ranch, crossed over five fences, including two
barbed wire fences, and peered through netting over locked wooden gates into
a barn. Id. at 297-98. The officers obtained a search warrant on the basis of
what they saw in the barn. Id. at 298. The Court concluded that because the
barn did not fall within the "curtilage" of the house, the officers lawfully
observed the barn's interior. Id. at 301, 305.
27. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496,500-01 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
searches of carry-on baggage at airports reasonable if individuals receive fair
warning of the impending search).
28. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971). White concerned the
admissibility of evidence the police obtained through a wired informant. Id. at
746-47. The Court reasoned that anyone contemplating criminal activity takes
the risk that persons they speak with may go to the police with the information.
Id. at 752. Thus, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation, even when the declarant subjectively believes the dialogue is private. Id.
at 752-53.
29. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). Although bank
patrons disclose personal financial information for a limited purpose, the fact
that the bank may, at any time, disclose the information to a third party
eliminates the patron's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 442-43. "The
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any personal effects after they have been sent to prison. 31
2. Presumption of a Warrant Supported by Probable Cause
and Exceptions to the Presumption
If a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her person or in the area police want to search, courts generally
require that the police must obtain a warrant. 2 To obtain a
warrant, the police must demonstrate to a detached, neutral
magistrate3 that they have probable cause to search. 4
Just as many state actions do not constitute a "search or
seizure" because courts do not find a reasonable expectation of
privacy," courts will excuse police from acquiring a warrant in
exigent circumstances, 36 such as the protection of individuals3 7

depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the government." Id. at 443 (citing White,

401 U.S. at 751-52).
30. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). Although citizens
subjectively may expect that no one will examine their garbage, the Court found
trash deposited on the curb sufficiently exposed to the public to negate any
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 39-41. Because any member of the
public has access to the trash, the police also may search and seize the trash.
Id. at 40-41.
31. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Although "prisons are not
beyond the reach of the Constitution," the Court held "that society is not
prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that
a prisoner might have in his prison cell." Id. at 523, 526. In the case of
prisons, the reduced expectation of privacy flows from the restrictions of
incarceration. Id. at 524. The Court curtails many rights of prisoners to
further a prison's "institutional needs and objectives." Id. at 523-24 (quoting
Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)).

32. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (holding that
allowing warrantless searches when sufficient evidence exists to support a
search warrant "would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity"); see also
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
62 (1992) (noting the "per se" warrant presumption rule).
33. A neutral magistrate need not be legally trained. See Shadwick v. City
of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (upholding arrest warrant issued by
municipal court clerk).
34. To demonstrate probable cause, the police must provide information
sufficient for a magistrate to believe it probable that "relevant evidence will be
found in the place to be searched." Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294
(1984).
35. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (describing instances in
which citizens do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
36. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-15 ("There are exceptional circumstances in
which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of
privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be
dispensed with.").
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Courts also will excuse the

warrant requirement when police stop a person upon reasonable
suspicion of his or her involvement in a crime and frisk the
person upon reasonable suspicion that he or she is carrying
weapon. 9 Lastly, courts excuse the warrant requirement for
searches based on "special needs."40
Under the rubric of

"special needs," the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless entry

of homes,4 ' regulatory searches of businesses, 4 2 traffic stops
for drunk drivers,4 3 and mandatory drug testing for certain

37. See United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984)
(upholding police's warrantless entry to attend to a suspect after they shot him).
38. See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 773 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding police officers' warrantless, forced entry into apartment due to an
"urgent need," including the "need to prevent the loss of evidence"), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). Under Terry, the police may
make an investigative seizure of a person based solely on reasonable suspicion
that the person is about to commit a crime. Id. at 22. Although a "stop and
frisk" constitutes a "search and seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, the
government has a significant interest in "crime prevention and detection." Id.
at 19, 22. The government also has an important interest in the officer's safety
and the safety of the general public. Id. at 23-24, 30. Together, these state
interests sufficiently justify a search and seizure based on reasonable suspicion
that persons are involved in criminal activity and may be armed and dangerous.
Id. at 30.
40. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (holding that "when
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" exist, courts will
permit exceptions to the warrant requirement (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))); New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 693-94, 712 (1987) (upholding a noncriminal, administrative search
of a junkyard based on special public safety needs).
41. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-26 (1971) (upholding
warrantless entry by welfare caseworker during home visits); see also Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding that reasonable
administrative standards to search an entire neighborhood area satisfy probable
cause to search a particular home).
42. Burger, 482 U.S. at 712. Burger upheld a statute authorizing
warrantless random searches of junkyards. Id. at 693-94, 712. Although the
Fourth Amendment applies to commercial as well as residential property,
businesses in a closely regulated industry have a reduced expectation of privacy.
Id. at 700. The Court articulated three criteria for courts to apply in
determining whether to uphold a warrantless inspection: The government must
have a "substantial" interest, the warrantless inspection must be "necessary to
further [the] regulatory scheme," and the statute authorizing the inspections
must provide regularity and certainty to act as a substitute warrant. Id. at
702-03 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that the third criterion
required limited discretion for inspecting officials. Id. at 703.
43. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990). In Sitz,
the state police had established a checkpoint program to fight drunk driving.
Id. at 447. The police stopped every vehicle passing through the checkpoint,
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employees." In each of these cases, the State's need for the
invasion of an individual's privacy outweighs the presumption
for requiring warrants supported by probable cause.4 5
B. DIMINISHING RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
Consistent with this trend of mitigating Fourth Amendment
rights, courts generally have narrowed public school students'
constitutional rights.4 6 Beginning in the 1940s, the Supreme
Court recognized that students enjoy some level of constitutional
protection.4 7 Two decades later, the Court appeared ready to
that some student rights nearly are equal to adult
recognize
48
rights.
The climate began to change in 1975, however, when the
Court began restricting students' rights. In Goss v. Lopez, the
Court recognized that students have certain due process rights
before a school can suspend them, 49 but the Court nonetheless
refrained from giving the students the same constitutional

examining drivers for "signs of intoxication." Id. The Court found a "special
governmental need" to stop drunk driving, and characterized the drivers'
privacy invasion as "slight." Id. at 450-51. Balancing these interests, the Court
held that the "government need" outweighed the privacy intrusion and upheld
the checkpoint procedure against a Fourth Amendment challenge. Id. at 455.
44. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see
also infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text (describing the Skinner decision
upholding drug tests for railroad employees).
45. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 ("[T]he balance.., weighs in favor of the
state program."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) ("[Tlhe proper balance...
leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit
a reasonable search [of the person].").
46. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (eliminating
the warrant and probable cause requirements for searches of students in public
schools); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 584 (1975) (narrowing procedural due
process protection for school suspensions); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982,
984 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding warrantless search of a student), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
47. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(striking a school's compulsory flag salute and pledge on First Amendment
grounds).
48. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969) (holding that school board could not suspend students for
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War) with Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564, 573-75 (1968) (holding that school board could not
dismiss teacher for writing letter to the local newspaper criticizing the board's
policies).
49. 419 U.S. at 576.
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protection as adults.5 ° The dissent suggested that "there are
differences which must be accommodated in determining the
rights and duties of children as compared with those of
adults."5'
Since Goss, federal courts have limited student rights in a
series of cases stressing the importance of the states' interests
in maintaining safe schools and positive learning environments.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Acton, for example,
school officials could censor school newspapers,5 2 search student
possessions," and search students themselves5 4 without violating the Constitution. New Jersey v. TL.O., decided ten years
before Acton, exemplifies the Supreme Court's shift away from
presuming that a warrant supported by probable cause is
required for school searches and toward a less rigid Fourth
Amendment balancing test.55
Upholding a vice-principal's warrantless search of a
student's purse,5 6 the Court in TL.O. ruled that the warrant
requirement was unsuited to schools because forcing authorities
to go to a neutral magistrate before conducting a search caused
intolerable delays.5" These delays, along with the probable
cause requirement, interfered with swift, informal school
discipline and the school's need to maintain order.5" Therefore,
the Court decided that searches of student belongings did not
require probable cause and a warrant, but rather only individualized suspicion and overall reasonableness.5 9 The Court
determined the reasonableness of the search by "balancing the

50. Id. at 581, 584. Rather than requiring schools to provide students with
a hearing before suspending them, the Court held that schools need only give
students written or oral notice of the disciplinary charges, and provide them
with a hearing "almost immediately" after suspension. Id. at 580-82. The
Court also recognized that in extraordinary cases, courts could waive even these
minimal requirements in the interests of safety and the integrity of the
academic process. Id. at 582-83.
51. Id. at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
53. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
54. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982, 984 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
55. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337, 341-42.
56. Id. at 328.
57. Id. at 340.
58. Id. at 340-41.
59. Id. at 341-42.
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need to search against the invasion which the search entails. " "
Applying this test, the Court found that the school's substantial
interest in maintaining order on school grounds and in the
classroom outweighed the intrusion of searching the student's
purse.6 '
Courts cite several reasons why public school students
should have a lesser expectation of privacy than adults;62 school
teachers and administrators have a duty to provide positive
learning environments and to protect students, 63 and parents
have a right to expect that their children will be safe while at
school.64 Thus, school officials must have discretion to take
actions to ensure these duties are fulfilled.65 Courts recognize
that commanding cumbersome procedures before searching
students and seizing evidence of their unlawful activity would
undermine these safety and educational goals.
C.

SHRINKING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FROM
WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING

The Supreme Court has held that drug testing, whether by
breathalyzer, urine samples, or blood samples, constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search because it intrudes upon the private

60. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (quoting Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)).
61. Id. at 339, 346. Despite the majority opinion's deference to the school,
two justices criticized the opinion for overstating students' reasonable privacy
expectations. Id. at 348-50 (Powell, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated:
I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its opinion. I
would place greater emphasis, however, on the special characteristics
of elementary and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford
students the same constitutional protection granted adults and
juveniles in a nonschool setting. In any realistic sense, students within
the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of the population generally.
Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. Basic constitutional protection also are different for juveniles in
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984)
(noting that the state's parenting role justifies different treatment between
juveniles and adults regarding pretrial detention).
63. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985). In Tarter, the court
upheld a school search of a student for marijuana on the ground that school
discipline and a safe environment obviated the need for a warrant. Id. at 984.
64. Id. at 982 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 983.
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domain of the human body.66 Urinalysis, for example, involves
a highly private excretory function. 7 Urination is not only a
traditionally private activity, "its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom."" Urinalysis also allows testers to discover a variety of protected
information about the testing subjects in addition to whether
they have used narcotics.69
Despite the warrant presumption for searches," federal
courts have upheld avarietyofwarrantless and even suspicionless
drug testing programs. In 1975, the D.C. Circuit upheld warrantless, suspicionless drug testing in the military.7' The next year,
the Seventh Circuit held that mandatory warrantless,
suspicionless drug testing of public bus drivers following their
involvement in an accident was reasonable.72 In 1984, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld

66. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989)
(urine testing); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767 (1966) (blood testing).
Notably, the use of blood testing, and presumably urine testing, to gather
evidence does not constitute "testimony" and therefore does not implicate the
Fifth Amendments protection against self-incrimination. Schmerber, 384 U.S.
at 761-65.
67. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.
68. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(1987) ("Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all."),
affd in part and vacated in part,489 U.S. 656 (1989).
69. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 ("[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of
blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including
whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.").
70. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing presumption of a
warrant requirement).
71. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476-77 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Because citizens give up some expectations of privacy by choosing to join
the armed forces, the court reasoned that a balancing of interests was the most
appropriate standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the testing. Id. at
477. In light of the rising rate of drug abuse by members of the Armed Forces,
the serious threat drugs in the military pose to national security, the lack of
criminal prosection in cases of drug detection, and the overall reasonableness
of the testing procedure, the court held that the military drug testing program
passed constitutional requirements. Id. at 476-77. The court found the
program reasonable even though the testing procedure could involve searches
of the groin and anal areas. Id. at 475.
72. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267
(7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). Balancing the
interests involved, the court found that the state's "paramount" interest in
public safety outweighed any reasonable expectation of privacy of the drivers
for the purpose of drug testing. Id. The court also held that giving urinalysis
and blood tests in the hospital was a reasonable way to take the samples. Id.
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warrantless, suspicionless drug testing of the prison population.7 3
In 1989, the Supreme Court clarified the balancing test for
drug testing cases. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n,74 the Court upheld mandatory testing for all railroad
employees involved in certain train accidents.75 The Court
found a special governmental need to ensure safety on the
nation's railways. 76 This need justified the privacy intrusion of
drug testing without a warrant or even individualized suspicion. 7 Because railroad employees voluntarily participate in
a heavily regulated industry, the Court held that they have a
reduced expectation of privacy when they are working. 7 The
Court found that the drug tests were no more intrusive than
some procedures often encountered in a physical examination79
and that the program's limitations on discretion essentially

73. Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The test
at issue in Storms involved a random, daily check of urine samples for
marijuana and narcotics. Id. at 1216. Because prisoners have reduced
constitutional rights once incarcerated, the court reasoned that their expectation of privacy in their bodies was similarly reduced. Id. at 1218-19 (citing Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979)). In balancing the interests of the state
against prisoner privacy interests, the court deferred to the decision of state
prison officials who regarded the tests as necessary for deterring drug use and
maintaining discipline. Id. at 1220-21. Because prison officials needed such
minimal probable cause to initiate testing, the program was essentially random.
Id. at 1220. The court did not find this lack of reasonable suspicion relevant in
evaluating the program's reasonableness. Id. Consequently, the court held that
the state's interest in maintaining safe and drug-free prisons outweighed the
prisoners' limited privacy expectations. Id. at 1224.
74. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
75. Id. at 633. The policy required the railroad to administer drug tests
after a "major train accident," defined as "any train accident [involving] (i) a
fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or
a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more."
Id. at 609. The railroad also gave tests following an "impact accident" involving
more than $50,000 damage and "[any train incident that involves a fatality to
any on-duty railroad employee." Id.
76. Id. at 620.
77. Id. at 619-21. The Court emphasized that the drug tests were
reasonable even though they were not predicated upon particularized suspicion
of a railroad employee's drug use. Id. at 624 ("In limited circumstances, where
the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.").
78. Id. at 627.
79. Id. at 626-27.
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duplicated the detached objectivity of a magistrate." Balancing
the government's interests against those of the railroad employees, the Court found that the tests did not violate the Fourth
Amendment."'
Because the Skinner policy mandated blanket testing of
employees after a train accident, the railroad officials did not
need individualized suspicion to select employees for drug
testing.82 The Court held that testing based on reasonable
suspicion was not a viable alternative to blanket testing in part
because of the difficulty in establishing particularized
suspicion
3
in the aftermath of a major train accident.1
The Court also balanced the interests involved and upheld
warrantless, suspicionless drug testing for U.S. Customs Service
employees in Skinner's companion case, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab.84 In Von Raab, employees
challenged the government's policy of drug testing any individual
accepting a promotion to a position involving drug enforcement
or gun handling. 5 As in Skinner, the special governmental
interest in public safety outweighed the employees' reasonable
expectation of privacy 86 and therefore justified searches without
reasonable suspicion.87

80. Id. at 622. The program stated specifically the circumstances
warranting drug testing and the limitations on the test's intrusion. Id.; cf
supra note 42 (discussing the importance of objectivity and lack of discretion in
.special needs" safety search of junkyards).
81. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
82. Id. at 609 (noting that the program subjected "all crew members and
other covered employees directly involved in [an] accident" to drug testing
(emphasis added)).
83. Id. at 631; see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (finding reasonable suspicion impractical when
conditions "rarely generate articulable grounds for searching any particular
place or person").
84. 489 U.S. at 679.
85. Id. at 660-61. The employees also challenged the portion of the policy
covering individuals who handle "classified materials," but the Court declined
to rule on this issue, citing inadequacy in the record. Id. at 679.
86. Id. at 679. The condition that employees had to take the test only if
they chose to accept a promotion weighed in the government's favor. Id. at 667.
The Court held the drug test valid even though the government presented no
evidence that drug problems existed among Customs Service employees. Id. at

660.
87. Id. at 668-69.
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D. DRUG TESTING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
1. Pre-Acton Decisions
Although the Supreme Court did not examine drug testing
in public schools prior to Acton, a few lower court decisions
addressed the issue. In Anable v. Ford,8 8 a federal district
court struck down a mandatory school drug testing program
because it viewed the program as excessively intruding on
students' Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 9 The drug
testing policy applied to any student whom a school official
reasonably suspected "may be hiding evidence of a wrongdoing."9 ° In Anable, a school staff member ordered one of the
plaintiffs to "squat in the open and to urinate into a vial" to
obtain the sample for testing.9 According to the court, the
search failed to pass TL.O.'s Fourth Amendment test for
"reasonableness" in the public schools.92 The court also questioned the test's ability to expose sanctioned drug use.9"
In Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent
9 4 the District Court for the Southern District of
School District,
Texas struck down a school district's random drug testing
program for students in extracurricular activities." The East
Chambers school district had implemented a random urinalysis
test, given in the privacy of a bathroom with no other observers, 96 and it prohibited students who tested positive from
participating in extracurricular activities."
Using TL.O.'s

88. 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark.), modified by 663 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark.
1985).
89. Id. at 41. Notably, the court did not factor the severity of the penalty
for drug use, denying the student credit for an entire semester, into its
assessment of the program's constitutionality. Id. at 26.
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id. at 41 (finding that the "need" for the search did not justify its
"excessively intrusive nature").
93. Id. at 22, 39-40 (noting drug test's propensity to "yield a false negative
result).
94. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd mem., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.
1991).
95. Id. at 766. The school administered the test once at the beginning of
the semester and then randomly throughout the term to any student participat-

ing in extracurricular activities. Id. at 760.
96. Id. at 762.
97. Id.

1996]

SCHOOL DRUG TESTING

1235

balancing test9" the court determined that the school failed to
show any reasonable justification for random drug testing.9 9
The school's drug testing program, therefore, violated the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches and
seizures. 100
In the only decision prior to Acton upholding a school drug
10 1
testing program, Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.,
the Seventh Circuit held that random urine testing of student
athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 10 2 The court
noted that student athletes have a reduced expectation of
privacy0 3 and that the program's safeguards limited official
Because the school had a strong interest in
discretion.'
curbing student drug use'0 5 and the program did not allow
police to use test results for criminal prosecution,' the court
found the program reasonable.' 7
2. The Acton Decision
A majority of the Supreme Court in Acton found that the

98. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (describing T.L.O.'s test
for determining the reasonableness of limiting public school students' Fourth
Amendment rights).
99. Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759,
764-66 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd mem., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991). The court
found little evidence that drugs caused any major problems in operating the
East Chambers school and no evidence that drugs created any particular
problem in the school's extracurricular activities. Id. at 761. Further, the court
found no evidence that drug use by students involved in extracurricular
activities interfered with the school's educational environment more than drug
use by other students, no evidence that the testing deterred students from using
drugs, and no evidence of the inherent risks present in cases such as Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), or National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at
764-66; see supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing Skinner);
supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing Von Raab); cf supra note
1 and accompanying text (noting the serious problem with student drug use in
the Vernonia School District).
100. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 766.
101. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 1324.
103. Id. at 1318.
104. Id. at 1321-22 (noting that officials used random selection rather than
personal discretion to choose athletes for testing, enacted measures to ensure
testing accuracy, and conveyed information designed to keep students informed
of program operation).
105. Id. at 1320.
106. Id. at 1322 n.18.
107. Id. at 1322, 1324.
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Vernonia School District's random drug testing policy for student
athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'
The Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment's guarantees extend to
searches and seizures by school officials" 9 and that statecompelled urine testing constitutes a "search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes." ° The Court held, however, that the
"special needs" of the public school environment rendered the
warrant requirement inapplicable to a constitutional evaluation
of a school-enforced drug testing program."' Additionally, the2
Court rejected TL.O.'s reasonable suspicion requirement,"
holding that the Constitution only required balancing the
students' Fourth Amendment intrusion against the legitimate
government interests at stake."1
The Court began the balancing process by examining public
school students' reasonable expectation of privacy." 4 Because
students are "unemancipated minors"" 5 and are "committed to
the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster,"" 6 the
Court found that students have a reduced expectation of
privacy."' In so holding, the Court relied on a number of
previous cases supporting a reduced expectation of privacy for
schoolchildren" 8 and noted that schools already subject students to intrusive physical examinations and vaccinations." 9
Student athletes' expectation of privacy should be even

108. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995).
109. Id. at 2390 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)).
110. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
617 (1989)).
111. Id. at 2390-91 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987);
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41).
112. Id. at 2391 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of [reasonable] suspicion." (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8));
see supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing suspicionless drunk
driving traffic stops); supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing
suspicionless railroad employee drug testing).
113. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
114. Id. at 2391-93.
115. Id. at 2391.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2391-92; see also supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the reduced constitutional rights courts give to public school
students).
118. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386,2392 (1995); see supra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why public school
students inherently have a reduced expectation of privacy).
119. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2392.
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lower, the Court reasoned, because they dress in locker rooms
"not notable for the privacy they afford." 20
In addition,
schools require student athletes to maintain health insurance
coverage, keep up their grades, comply with team dress codes,
and attend mandatory practices. 2' In this respect, the Court
found that the athletes' voluntary participation resulted in a
reduced expectation of privacy much like that of adults
who
22
choose to "participate in a closely regulated industry.
The Court then examined the urine test's intrusiveness.12
Although the Court recognized excretory functions as extremely
private,'" Vernonia's policy provided for sample collection in a
manner "nearly identical" to conditions in an ordinary public
restroom'" and thus were negligibly intrusive. 126 Although
the Court expressed concern about the variety of information
discoverable through urinalysis, it also found that the
school's
2
narrow use of test results was minimally intrusive. 1
Finally, the Court examined the government's interest in
compelling random drug testing of public school athletes."2
The Court held that the state's interest need not be "compelling,"
only "important enough to justify the particular search at
hand.""
The Court found that deterring drug use among
schoolchildren constituted a very important state interest. 3 °

120. Id. at 2392-93.
121. Id. at 2393.
122. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
627 (1989)); see supra text accompanying note 78 (noting that employees in the
closely regulated railroad industry have a reduced expectation of privacy).
123. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2393.
124. Id. ("[Clollecting the samples for urinalysis intrudes upon 'an excretory
function traditionally shielded by great privacy.'" (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at
626)); see also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing privacy of
urination).
125. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2393. Boys gave their samples at a urinal and fully
clothed. Id. at 2389. Girls gave their samples within the confines of a
bathroom stall. Id. The same-sex monitors may not see the students actually
producing the sample in either case. Id.
126. Id. at 2393.
127. Id. The Court stressed that the tests checked only for drugs, and that
school officials reviewed the results, not the police. Id. The Court also found
that forcing students to disclose the medications they were taking prior to
testing constituted an insignificant privacy intrusion. Id. at 2394.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2394-95.
130. Id. at 2395. The Court found the school's interest in eliminating drug
abuse at least as important as ensuring efficient enforcement of national laws
banning drug importation, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
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The Court noted that drug use affects entire student bodies, not
just the individual user, because drug users disrupt the entire
educational process.'' Moreover, drug use is especially dangerous to student athletes because drugs increase the13risk
of
2
injuries to the user and other participants in the sport.
The Court rejected an argument for basing the drug testing
program on reasonable suspicion.'
It reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment does not require searches to be the "least
intrusive" possible." 4 Furthermore, a policy based on reasonable suspicion raises the danger of discriminatory selection of
students for testing.'3 5 According to the Court, teachers are
not in a position to add identification of drug users to an already
long list of teaching demands. 8' Further, drug-impaired
students "seldom display any outward 'signs detectable by the
lay person or, in many cases, even the physician.'"'37 Thus,
the Court found a reasonable suspicion standard impractical
because teachers would be unable to
perceive or articulate
13
grounds for selecting students to test.
II. EXTENDING ACTON BEYOND STUDENT ATHLETES
In Acton and TL. 0., the Supreme Court made it clear that
school searches are not subject to the Fourth Amendment

489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989), or deterring the use of drugs by railway employees,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989). Acton,
115 S. Ct. at 2395. Additionally, the Court recognized Vernonia's particular
disciplinary difficulties related to the increasing number of student drug users.
Id. at 2395.
131. Id. The Court accepted Vernonia's contention that drug and alcohol use
caused an epidemic disciplinary problem for the Vernonia schools. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2396.
134. Id.
135. Id. ("Respondents' proposal brings the risk that teachers will impose
testing arbitrarily upon troublesome but not drug-likely students.").

136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
628 (1989)); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme
Court's rejection of a reasonable suspicion standard for drug testing railroad
employees as impractical). But see Sheldon D. Blunk, Casenote, Suspicionless
Drug Testing of PublicSchool Students: Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated
Independent School District, 17 S.U. L. REv. 339, 350 (1990) (arguing that
teachers are well-positioned to identify drug-impaired students because of their
close proximity to students throughout the entire school day).
138. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2396.
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warrant requirement. 39 A school district setting up a drug
testing program, then, can choose students to take drug tests
based on reasonable suspicion or select them randomly, but it
need not obtain a warrant for each student tested. Reasonable
suspicion requires school officials to have particularized evidence
of drug use for every student they want to test. With random
selection, school officials draw a certain number of students from
a pool of candidates. Each method offers its own balance
between effectiveness, intrusiveness, and administrative
convenience. A discussion of these procedures elucidates both
their benefits and problems from a Fourth Amendment perspective.
A.

TESTING BASED ON REASONABLE SUSPICION

Although schools have two ways to implement a drug
program based on reasonable suspicion-subjective selection
based on observation and disciplinary violation testing-both
present prohibitive problems.
1. Problems with Subjective Selection Based on Observation
In her dissenting opinion in Acton, Justice O'Connor
advocated a reasonable suspicion standard for selecting students
for drug testing. 4 ° Rather than using a lottery, a school would
test only students whom school officials reasonably suspected as
drug users.' 4 ' In addition to invading the privacy of fewer
students than blanket testing,'42 selection based on reasonable
suspicion would ensure that students retain control over whether
the school will test them.'4 3 Students could avoid urinalysis
altogether by avoiding the appearance of drug use.'
Proponents of this method, therefore, argue that reasonable

139. See supra notes 57-59, 111 and accompanying text (describing the
Supreme Court's willingness to dispense with warrant and probable cause
requirements for searches of public school students).
140. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2397-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142. O'Connor noted that blanket searches affected scores of people while
suspicion-based searches affected only "one person at a time." Id. at 2397
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987));
see also infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent quantity
limitation on reasonable suspicion selection).
143. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. More specifically, students can avoid testing by not exhibiting any
characteristics likely to give a school official reasonable suspicion that they have
been using drugs.
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suspicion testing is superior to random blanket testing. They
claim that teachers represent ideal monitors to identify students
"under the influence" because they observe students throughout
the day as part of ordinary teaching responsibilities and can
recognize uncharacteristic student behavior. 45 Although some
commentators, as well as the Acton Court itself, believe that
identifying drug-impaired individuals is difficult, 4 6 proponents
of reasonable suspicion testing argue that teachers are in a
better position to notice a student's drug problem than parents,
who often have little close contact with their teenagers. 47
A program based on reasonable suspicion, however, also has
serious disadvantages. Reasonable suspicion testing limits the
number of students tested, 4 s thereby decreasing the number
of drug-using students identified and thus program effectiveness.
Testing based on reasonable suspicion will cause more implementation difficulties than a random program because, despite
teachers' proximity to students, identifying drug users is
extremely difficult.149 In addition, burdening teachers with the
task of identifying drug users adds
a heavy responsibility to
50
their already time-pressured days.1
Because reasonable suspicion also stigmatizes those
students chosen for testing,' 5 ' parents who support a random
program may not accept testing based on suspicion.' 52 School
officials also could use the auspices of reasonable suspicion to
discriminate against rude students, racial or ethnic minorities,

145. See supra note 137 (discussing the special role of teachers that enables
them to notice uncharacteristic student behavior).
146. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; see supra note 137 and accompanying text
(noting difficulty of identifying drug users).
147. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes:Emancipating
Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239, 239 (1992) (stating that
during adolescence, "the child accomplishes some degree of separation from the
parents").
148. Because a reasonable suspicion program demands particularized
suspicion for every student selected, it generally tests fewer students than
programs based on random selection.
149. See supratext accompanying note 137 (describing the difficulty for lay
people and even physicians charged with identifying drug users).
150. See supra text accompanying note 137 (describing the difficulty to
identify drug users); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting
teachers' overburdened agendas); cf supra note 83 and accompanying text
(noting the Supreme Court's rejection of reasonable suspicion standard for train
employee drug testing in part because of difficulty in determining suspicion).
151. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
152. Id.
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or simply unlikable students.15 3
Discriminatory selection
opens the door to student lawsuits,' and prevention of such
suits would require schools to implement detailed procedures for
documenting reasonable suspicion.' 55
With these social and procedural costs in mind, the Court
generally has moved away from requiring individualized
suspicion toward allowing blanket searches of all members in a
given group.'56 Although blanket searches invade the privacy
of more people, they also guard against official discrimination
toward certain individuals or classes.'5 7 Moreover, the Court
already has determined that the Fourth Amendment does not
demand the "least intrusive" means possible.'
Although the
Court may decline to uphold suspicionless drug testing for the
general population, it has expressed a greater willingness to
permit such a method in public schools.'59
2. Problems with Disciplinary Violation Testing
A second form of reasonable suspicion, the one Justice
O'Connor formally advocated in Acton, 6 ' involves testing only
those students who belong to a suspect class of likely drug users,
153. Id. ("Respondents' proposal brings the risk that teachers will impose
testing arbitrarily upon troublesome but not drug-likely students."). Random
selection cures this problem by eliminating school officials' discretion in
selecting students. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting the
constitutionality of a drunk driving checkpoint where every driver is stopped).
154. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 41-44, 82-83, 87 and accompanying text (noting series
of "special needs" cases in which the Supreme Court upheld blanket searches
for drunk driving traffic stops, regulatory searches of businesses, and drug
testing); see also supra notes 27, 71-73 and accompanying text (noting "special
needs" cases in which lower courts upheld searches of airplane carry-on luggage
and drug testing of soldiers, bus drivers, and prisoners). The Supreme Court
continued its "special needs" trend in Acton. See supra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text (describing the Court's reasoning in rejecting a reasonable
suspicion standard in favor of blanket testing); see also supra note 112 and
accompanying text (describing the Court's rejection of T.L.O.'s reasonable
suspicion standard).
157. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; see supra note 135 and accompanying text
(describing the Acton Court's concern that reasonable suspicion policy will be
used in discriminatory fashion).
158. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; see supra text accompanying note 134 (noting
the Acton majority's rejection of "least intrusive" means testing).
159. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (warning against "the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other
contexts").
160. Id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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for example, students who break disciplinary rules. This method
is a form of reasonable suspicion testing because it imputes
suspicion of drug use onto students who break school rules. 6 '
This form of testing, however, is underinclusive because not
every student using drugs will face disciplinary charges and
overinclusive because not every discipline problem involves a
drug user.
More importantly, determining what behavior constitutes a
disciplinary violation creates the same difficulties as identifying
signs of drug use. 62 Basing selection on such an arbitrary
standard raises the same problems with discriminatory testing
that the Supreme Court has avoided through its approval of
blanket testing in drug testing and other search cases.'63
Furthermore, even if a court overlooked the substantive and
procedural problems associated with discriminatory selection,
the tenuous nexus between discipline and drug use makes
disciplinary violations less useful as a selection factor for drug
testing than the symptoms of drug use themselves."6
B. RANDOM TESTING
In a random testing program, administrators draw a fixed
percentage of names from a pool of potential drug testing

161. A connection between disciplinary violations and drug use is especially
probable if the disruption "ha[s] a strong nexus to drug use." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
162. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of
identifying drug users). Like students on drugs who do not display visible
characteristics of their abuse, students on drugs who do not break disciplinary
rules will never be tested. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (noting
the difficulty of identifying drug users based on observation).
163. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (upholding blanket, random drug testing
of student athletes); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455
(1990) (upholding blanket drunk driving stops); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-668 (1989) (upholding blanket drug
testing of Customs Service employees); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (upholding blanket drug testing of railroad
employees); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (upholding
blanket searches of homes after showing of probable cause for an entire area);
supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Camara);supra note 43 and
accompanying text (discussing Sitz); supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text
(discussing Skinner); supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing Von
Raab); cf United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974)
(upholding blanket searches of carry-on baggage at airport); supranote 27 and
accompanying text (discussing Edwards).
164. See supra Part II.lA1. (discussing individualized suspicion based on
observable signs of drug use).
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candidates. Although random testing reaches more students 165
and limits official discretion,'6 6 it intrudes on the privacy of a
greater number of students and does not give innocent students
any chance of avoiding testing altogether. The Supreme Court
overlooked these deficiencies and upheld Vernonia's drug testing
policy for students athletes in Acton.1 67 The same reasoning
the Acton Court used to justify testing the limited pool of
student athletes, however, combined with the reasoning in other
recent Fourth Amendment cases, provides a basis for the public
schools to justify broader drug testing programs.
Courts will subject every future public school random drug
testing program to the same balancing test employed in
Acton, 16 8 Skinner,169 and Von Raab.70
For a future drug
testing program to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, the three
elements of the balancing test must weigh in favor of the state.
The students' reasonable expectation of privacy, considered in
light of the test's intrusion, must not outweigh the legitimate
state interests advanced by the program.' 7 '
1. Reduced Expectations of Privacy
a. Random Selection of Students Participatingin
School-sponsoredExtracurricularActivities
Schools might implement a broader random testing program
by placing all students participating in extracurricular activities
into the drug testing pool. During the pre-Acton era, a federal

165. Over the course of a school year, a random testing program possibly
could reach nearly every student in the testing pool. Given that any student
might be selected, this method also should increase the deterrent effect on
students.
166. School officials have no discretion in the selection process. They choose
the names randomly. Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing
necessary certainty of statutes that replace warrants); supra note 135 and
accompanying text (noting the dangers of official discretion in individualized
suspicion testing).
167. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
168. Id. at 2390-96; see supra notes 108-38 and accompanying text
(discussing Acton).
169. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-33
(1989); see supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing Skinner).
170. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-77
(1989); see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing Von Raab).
171. See supra notes 114, 123, 128 and accompanying text (describing the
Supreme Court's three-part analysis of Vernonia's drug testing policy for
student athletes).
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district court struck down such a drug program in Brooks v. East
Chambers Consolidated School District.1 2 In Brooks, however,
the court found no compelling state interest for testing students
involved in extracurricular activities, 73 a view the Supreme
Court rejected in Acton. 74
A Supreme Court finding that students in extracurricular
activities do not have a greater reasonable expectation of privacy
than student athletes would be consistent with Acton. Students
in extracurricular activities, like those in athletics, lack some of
the constitutional rights ordinarily held by adults because they
are in the state's custody. v5 Like student athletes, students
participating in school-sponsored extracurricular activities can
choose not to participate if they do not want to submit to drug
testing. 76 Students in extracurricular activities, like athletes,
also voluntarily submit to school regulations that other students
do not. 7 Thus, both groups of students hold somewhat similarly reduced privacy expectations.
The only significant difference between athletics and
extracurricular activities is that schools do not subject students

172. 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989); see supra notes 94-100 and
accompanying text (describing Brooks).
173. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 764-66.
174. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995)
(holding that deterring any student from using drugs is an "important," if not
"compelling," state interest).
175. See supra notes 46-65 (discussing students' reduced constitutional
rights). Although extracurricular activities are not officially "school activities,"
they are connected closely with the school environment. The school sponsors
the activities, usually with money, facilities, and human resources. In addition,
schools often heavily regulate extracurricular activities, frequently requiring a
dress code, minimum grade point average, and mandatory attendance. Finally,
the school remains in "custody" of the students, especially when a coach or an
advisor supervises the participants.
176. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F,2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974)
(describing the choice not to fly as creating the ability to avoid having luggage
searched); supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards); supra
note 78 and accompanying text (describing choice to take a railroad job and,
thus, to subject oneself to random drug testing in Skinner); supranote 122 and
accompanying text (describing students' choice to participate in athletics).
177. Examples include late-night rehearsals for marching band, specified
clothes and make-up for school plays, and school bus transportation for out-oftown debate competitions. Cf Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (upholding drug testing of railway eiiiployees, who chose
to participate in heavily regulated industry); supra note 121 and accompanying
text (noting student athlete regulations in Acton).
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participating in extracurricular activities to locker room
undress. 7 ' Schools may require them to conform to a mandatory dress code, but they ordinarily will not force them to change
clothes in front of other participants. Despite this distinguishing
characteristic, however, the Court's reluctance to extend full
Fourth Amendment protection to participants in any "closely
regulated industry"7 9 or to students generally 180 provides an
underlying justification for denying full Fourth Amendment
protection to students in extracurricular activities. Given the
many regulations schools customarily impose on participants in
extracurricular activities,' 81 Acton permits a finding that
students in athletics and students in extracurricular activities
hold essentially the same privacy expectations." 2
b.

Random Selection from the Entire Student Body

A random drug testing program for an entire student body
raises more constitutional questions than programs for students
in either athletics or extracurricular activities. Blanket random
testing eliminates one of the primary characteristics justifying
many of federal courts' decisions upholding diminished Fourth
Amendment rights: voluntariness.'8 3 Students participating in

178. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93; see supra note 120 and accompanying text
(describing the lack of privacy in locker rooms). Some extracurricular activities,
such as a school play or marching band, may involve some form of communal
undress.
179. See supra notes 42, 78, 122 and accompanying text (describing a
reduced expectation of privacy in heavily regulated industries).
180. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (describing the reduced
Fourth Amendment rights of public school students).
181. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting possible school
regulations for students participating in extracurricular activities).
182. In addition, the drug-use justification for regulating public school
student conduct is at least as strong as preventing railway accidents or
preserving an effective Customs Service. See supra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text (describing Acton's formulation of important government
interest). This strong interest was enough for the Court to uphold testing for
athletes and is equally applicable here. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. Furthermore, students start with a lower expectation of privacy than adult citizens.
See supra notes 62-65, 115-19 and accompanying text (describing reduced
expectation of privacy for public school students). Additionally, drug use does
implicate safety and educational concerns for children in school, even those
students not involved in athletics. See supra note 16 (discussing relationship
between drugs and violence in adolescents).
183. See, e.g., supra notes 78, 86, 122 and accompanying text (noting cases
in which voluntary participation in an activity or job justified participants'
reduced expectation of privacy).
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athletics and other extracurricular activities choose to participate, thereby agreeing to abide by the school's additional rules
and requirements."M By contrast, students who simply 185
attend
classes do not have the option of refusing to participate.
Ajudicial finding that the absence of voluntary participation
does not make a significant difference in determining students'
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, would be consistent
with recent Supreme Court precedent. Student rights overall
are shrinking." 6 In addition, past Supreme Court cases
justifying Fourth Amendment intrusions based on the
voluntariness of participants included several cases where the
"choice" may have been illusory because the alternatives were
impractical or infeasible.'
Thus, even though school attendance may be involuntary, voluntariness may be essentially
irrelevant where a student otherwise has a severely reduced
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Although schools do not force nonathletes to undergo
complete physical examinations, they compel vaccinations and
require health insurance, which typically requires a physical. 1'
Students, therefore, already expect some privacy invasions associated with schooling. Furthermore, the custodial
character of the school environment, though not as rigorous and
demeaning as prison or the military, fosters expectations in both
students and their parents that the school will restrict some
184. See supranotes 122, 176 and accompanying text (noting the choice that
students involved in athletics or other extracurricular activities make).
185. States usually impose compulsory school attendance until the age of
sixteen or eighteen. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120.101, subd. 5 (1994) (mandating
compulsory school attendance between ages seven and sixteen until the year
2000 and to age eighteen thereafter).
186. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
have constricted students' rights).
187. For many people, keeping a job is not a "choice." Cf supra note 78 and
accompanying text (discussing Skinner and railroad employees who "choose" to
participate in a heavily regulated industry). For someone with a family to
support, quitting work to preserve personal privacy is not a viable "choice."
Turning down a promotion may not be a "choice" either. See supra note 86
(describing Von Raab and Customs Service employees who "choose" to accept a
promotion). Even using an airplane may not represent a real "choice" if the trip
is of any significant distance and the individual has a deadline, either for work
or for personal reasons. See supranote 27 (discussing Edwards and the "choice"
to use the airlines for transportation).
188. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (noting compulsory student
physicals and vaccinations). On its face, a physical examination, which often
will include undress and physical contact, appears much more intrusive than
an Acton-type urinalysis test.
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student freedom.'89 Combined with school officials' duty to
protect students and to provide a positive learning environment, 9 ' a severely reduced expectation of privacy for any
student, not just those participating in athletics or extracurricular activities, would be consistent with Acton.
2. Intrusiveness
The second factor in the Acton balancing test is the intrusiveness of the testing procedure. Measuring intrusiveness
involves looking at both the mechanics of the test and the
penalties for a positive result.
a. Analyzing Drug Testing Procedures
School districts setting up a drug testing program of any
kind presumably will follow a testing procedure similar to the
one in Acton, a procedure the Supreme Court described as
negligibly intrusive.' 9 ' Unlike Anable v. Ford, where a district
court struck down a drug testing policy that forced a student to
provide a urine sample in the middle of a bathroom and in front
of a school official, 9 2 the Vernonia schools obtained urine
samples under conditions similar to those in a typical public
bathroom.'9 3
Significantly, the Vernonia school officials, not the police,
received the drug testing results so that students did not face
the danger of criminal prosecution. 9 4 Although it is possible
to garner private information unrelated to drugs through a urine

189. Cf supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting a reduced expectation
of privacy for prisoners); supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting the
constitutionality of drug testing in the military).
190. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme
Court's reasoning for diminished student rights).
191. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2393 (1995); see-supra
notes 123-27 and accompanying text (discussing negligible intrusiveness of
Acton's drug test). The Supreme Court found the testing no more intrusive
than a public restroom. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
192. Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 39-40 (W.D. Ark.), modified by 663 F.
Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1985); see supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text
(discussing Anable).
193. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389; see supra note 125 (discussing Vernonia's
procedure for obtaining urine samples from students in Acton).
194. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393; see supra note 41 and accompanying text
(noting permissibility of noncriminal, warrantless home entry by welfare
worker); supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting the importance of no
possibility of prosecution).
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test, 195 restricting the test results to locating illegal drugs
reduces the test's overall intrusiveness.'9 6 Finally, the use of
an accurate testing procedure 9 minimizes the danger of false,
positive drug testing results and thereby reduces the probability
that innocent students will receive punishment. 19' Thus, an
accurate urinalysis test, given in bathroom-like conditions, that
reveals only illegal drug use and is unavailable as evidence for
criminal prosecution, is minimally intrusive to any student, not
just athletes.
b. Punishment for Failed Drug Tests
In addition to testing procedure, the severity of punishment
for failed drug tests contributes to the test's intrusiveness. In
Acton, the school automatically suspended student athletes from
their teams if they failed two drug tests. 9 A similar punishment, school suspension, may not be appropriate for the student
body in general. °0 Students using drugs probably need the
discipline and education that a school environment provides to
improve their lives.
While suspension is a viable punishment, drug treatment is
a better cure for student drug use because it proactively
addresses the substance abuse problem.2 ' According to Acton,
the Constitution permits drug treatment as an appropriate
punishment for students testing positive on a drug test. °2

195. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing other information
obtainable through urinalysis testing, especially pregnancy).
196. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting the negligible
intrusiveness where school officials use tests only for purposes of detecting
certain illegal drugs in a student's system).
197. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389 (noting 99.94% accuracy of test used by
Vernonia).
198. See Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 39-40 (W.D. Ark.) (noting the
court's concern with the reliability of drug testing), modified by 663 F. Supp.
149 (W.D. Ark. 1985); supranote 93 and accompanying text (discussingAnable).
199. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390. The school suspension for two drug test
failures lasted up to two athletic seasons. Id.
200. Schools may not deprive students of their right to an education. See
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (holding that a state, having extended
the right to a public education generally, must "recognize a student's legitimate
entitlement to a public education" protected by the Due Process Clause).
201. See supra note 17 (describing the remarkable effectiveness of drug
testing and treatment in the military and business contexts).
202. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390; see supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing the program's use of drug counseling, along with athletic team
suspension, as "punishment" for failed drug tests).
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School detention for drug treatment, then, should satisfy the
Fourth Amendment as a necessary means to further the goals of
punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence. °3
3. State Interests
The third factor in the Acton balancing test is the state
interest involved. This involves looking at the scope of the
problem and the associated risk of student and societal harm.
a. Demonstratinga Student Drug Problem
The Acton decision rested in part on the district court's
finding that the Vernonia School District experienced an
increase in students abusing drugs, which directly correlated to
a decrease in classroom decorum. °4 Although almost any
American school could demonstrate some increased drug use
among students,0. in some schools that increase will be relatively insignificant due to deterrence or demographics. 0 6
The Supreme Court, however, has not hesitated to uphold
drug testing in nonschool contexts where an employer could not
show an increase in, or even a problem with, drug use. 0 ' In
Von Raab, for example, the Court found the state interest in
maintaining a drug-free Customs Service to be so important that
an absence of current drug problems did not affect the balancing
test.0 ' The Acton decision states that the school drug crisis is

203. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that urinalysis and
blood tests performed in a hospital were a reasonable way to further the goal
of deterring drug use among public bus drivers); supra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text (noting that students are already in state custody when at
school, making any additional custody an inconsequential privacy restriction).
204. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388; see supranote 14 (discussing Vernonia school
officials' problems with student discipline).
205. See supranote 15 and accompanying text (describing rising rate of drug
abuse among students across United States).
206. It is unlikely that every public school system in America has experienced a dramatic change in the school drug culture. Apparently, even schools
with a minimal increase can make a valid showing of a drug problem. See
Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395 (accepting Vernonia's evidence of pervasive drug
problems); cf id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that although
evidence of drug use at the high school existed, "there is virtually no evidence
in the record of a drug problem" in Vernonia's schools).
207. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 668-69 (1989) (upholding testing solely for drug use among Customs
Services employees); supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing Von
Raab).
208. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673-74.
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"of much greater proportions" than existed in Von Raab."9
Thus, a school's inability to demonstrate a drug problem to a
court should not prohibit the court from finding that a school has
a legitimate interest in deterring student drug use.
b. Dangers of Student Drug Abuse: A Compelling Interest?
To justify the drug testing program's intrusiveness, Acton
relied on the increased risk of physical harm present when
student athletes use drugs.210 Given the absence of physical
activity and contact in nonathletic activities, this rationale
appears difficult to extend to the hazards associated with other
extracurricular activities or to activities every student must
participate in for educational purposes. A closer examination,
however, reveals that the dangers associated with drugs can be
just as serious for nonathletes.
Drug use leads to an increase in violence21 ' and therefore
makes the school setting more dangerous for other students.2 12
Drug use also increases the risk of accidents in classes dealing
with potentially dangerous substances or objects, like mercury
in chemistry class, a dissection scalpel in biology, or highpowered tools in shop class."' Although not every student will
be taking a potentially dangerous class, all students face the risk
of being harmed in a violent, drug-associated outburst.
The impaired educational capacity and high dropout rate
associated with drug use also causes psychological injury and
high social costs.2 14 Studies have shown that drug use does

209. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673).
210. Id.; see supratext accompanying note 132 (noting the Court's sensitivity
to student athletes' particularly aggravated risk of physical injury caused by
drug use).
211. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting the correlation
between students using illegal drugs and students carrying guns).
212. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395; see supra note 131 and accompanying text
(noting the effect of one student's disruptive behavior on entire student body's
academic setting). Although the Acton Court specifically referred to the effect
on the academic environment, the effect of violence on an entire student body
is just as prevalent as disruptive behavior.
213. The detrimental effects of drug use on students' minds could result in
mistakes with dangerous objects or accidents caused by simple coordination
impairment. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting the dangerous
mental effects of drug use).
214. See supra note 16 (describing the relationship between drugs and poor
school performance as well as the correlation between drugs and the dropout
rate). Although the Court relied in part upon the threat of athletic injury, it did
not address the psychological and social injury issues. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at
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have a serious adverse impact on the educational environment.215 Students leaving school with an inadequate education
are more likely to be unemployed, to depend on the welfare
system, and to commit violent crime."' These results are a
large price for society to pay. Like the nation's interest in safe
transportation2 17 and an effective security and defense,2 18
society's interest in students' safety and educational quality is
compelling. The school's interest in stopping drug use, even
without an interest in preventing physical harm to athletes, is
therefore extremely important.2 19
III. PASSING THE TEST: A SCHOOL-WIDE DRUG
TESTING SCHEME THAT SURVIVES SUPREME COURT
SCRUTINY
If a school decides to adopt a random drug testing program
for all of its students, courts' balancing will favor the school's
interest over the students' Fourth Amendment rights.2
Although the constitutionality of a random drug testing program
for an entire student body is a closer call than testing solely for
student athletes, the state's important interest and the test's
minimal intrusiveness still should outweigh the students'
expectation of privacy. Additionally, from a policy standpoint,
the Court's concern with discriminatory selection and its
associated costs renders a program based on random selection
more appealing than one based on reasonable suspicion. 2 '

2395.
215. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing memory and
coordination deficiencies resulting from drug use, and correlation between
student drug use and dropout rates).
216. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,230 (1982) (noting that inadequate
education adds "to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and
crime"); Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking: A Chicano Perspective, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1193, 1205 (1991) (noting increased welfare, job-training,
and incarceration costs "attributable to inadequate education").
217. See supra notes 72, 76 and accompanying text (discussing the
government's interest in safe transportation systems).
218. See supra notes 71, 86 and accompanying text (discussing the
government's interest in drug-free military and Customs Service).
219. See supra note 77 (noting Supreme Court's unwillingness in Skinner to
abandon individualized suspicion without compelling state interests and
minimal intrusion).
220. See supra notes 114-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Acton
balancing test).
221. See supra notes 156, 163 and accompanying text (noting Supreme
Court's recent move toward blanket searches, even in the context of drug
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Given Acton's mandates for a school drug testing program,2 2 this Note proposes the following testing scheme:
DRUG TESTING POLICY FOR BLACKACRE PUBLIC
SCHOOL DISTRICT
Whereas despite efforts to thwart the rise of student drug
use through drug education programs and parent involvement,
the Blackacre School District's students continue to demonstrate
an increasing attraction to drugs; and
Whereas drugs have resulted in an increasingly unruly
student body, disrupting the educational purpose of the
Blackacre School District; and
Whereas as student drug use has increased, the dropout rate
also has increased; and
Whereas in addition to creating future societal burdens, both
for the Blackacre community and the country as a whole, drugs
threaten the students' personal safety and welfare; and
Whereas teachers have documented an increase in school
violence in the Blackacre public schools, frequently related to
students believed to be under the influence of illegal drugs; and
Whereas the impaired coordination and reasoning of
students using drugs also creates a high risk to users and other
students in any class employing dangerous materials or equipment; and
Whereas Blackacre's interest in halting drug use by students
is compelling:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Blackacre School Board assembled, that the
Blackacre School District announces a random drug testing
program for the entire student bodies of the district's high and
junior high schools. Each month during the school year, ten
percent of the students will be selected randomly to give a urine
sample.22' The testing will be administered to one student at

testing).
222. Acton's requirements for a public school drug testing program include
some evidence of a drug problem, although this may not be absolutely
necessary, a negligibly intrusive testing procedure, immunity from criminal
prosecution, and a narrowly tailored punishment. See supra notes 114-38 and
accompanying text (discussing these requirements).
223. The Supreme Court upheld monthly random drug testing often percent
of the student athletes. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389
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a time in a small, private room with a school official waiting
outside the door. The official will not observe the student
visually, but the official shall listen for the normal sounds of
urination and will check the sample for the proper temperature.
The samples will be labeled and sent directly to a laboratory to
be tested only for drugs. The results will not be used for
criminal prosecution, being immune from a prosecutor's discovery requests. In the case of a positive test, the student will be
given a second test. After failing a second test, the student must
stay after school each school day for two hours of drug counseling and academic tutoring for ten weeks, followed by six months
of periodic retesting.
CONCLUSION
Drug use in schools is a real danger to student safety and
education. Some schools have tried to remedy the problem
through drug testing programs, but these policies raise concerns
about student Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches. Applying the Fourth Amendment balancing test for
drug testing cases, Vernonia School District47J v. Acton upheld
a warrantless, random drug testing program for student
athletes. The Acton decision continued the recent judicial trend
of narrowing students' Fourth Amendment rights by eliminating
the reasonable suspicion requirement for public school drug
testing. Because the school drug problem exists beyond the
athletic context, this Note concludes that random, school-wide
testing would be consistent with the reasoning in Acton and
other Fourth Amendment privacy cases.
This Note therefore proposes a random drug testing program
for an entire student body that simultaneously would allow
schools to attack drug use on a wider scale and provide an
appropriate level of constitutional protection for students.
Although student privacy is important, the enormous challenge
that drugs present to schools justifies a minimally intrusive drug
test, especially given students' reduced expectation of privacy.
Courts must continue to protect student privacy in the drug
testing context by monitoring discriminatory selection and overly
intrusive testing. Additionally, the significance of the state
(1995). School officials still might select some students for testing, provided
they meet the reasonable suspicion and overall reasonableness standards
articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985). See supra text
accompanying notes 59-60 (discussing two-part test).
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interest in Acton is unique to the drug context. Courts only can
justify further privacy intrusions when the state interest is
equally high and the privacy intrusion is equally minimal.
Random, school-wide drug testing, therefore, does not signal the
"death" of student constitutional rights but rather a narrow
exception intended to give school officials a stronger weapon in
the war against drugs.

